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1196 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
yarsk radar sire and rhe development of rhe SS-25 ICBM, 
and growing tensions as rhe Cold War heightened. 
T he rreary would have provided for an initial overall 
limit of 2,400 srraregic nuclear delivery vehicles for each 
nation and a limit of 1,300 mulriple-independendy-
rarge table-reenrry vehicles (MIRV) carrying ballistic mis-
siles. T he protocol would have banned the deployment 
of air-to-su rface ballistic missi les (AS BMs) and ground-
and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) 
with ranges in excess of 600 ki lometers, whi le the Joint 
Sraremenr of Principles wou ld have provided for subse-
quent SALT III negoriarions. 
Sri II , rhe SALT II acco rds were observed by borh the 
US R and rhe Uni ted Stares on a vo luntary basis until 
May 1986, when President Ronald Reagan annou nced 
rhar the United Stares would no longer be bound by irs 
cei lings. In rhe meantime, a new round of arms control 
negotiations had already been initiated by rhe Reagan ad-
ministration in July 1982 under rhe Strategic Arms Re-
duction Talks (START I). 
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
Anns control talks ( TART I) berween d1e USSR and rhe 
United rates d1ar replaced the rraregicArms Limitation 
Talk ( ALT). T hese talks were carried our from June 
1982 until July 1991 , re ulring in the Treaty Berween me 
United tares and the USSR on the Reduction and Lim-
itat ion of Strategic Offen ive Arms. 
The e talks were initial ly conducted by me United 
Stares wid1 the goal of reducing large numbers of Soviet 
m ul rip le- i ndependen dy- ra rgerable- reen rry-veh icled 
(MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
while ar d1e same rime keeping intact U.S . submarine-
launched ballistic miss il es (SLBM) and ai r-laun h d c e . 
cruise-miss iles-(ALCM)-ba ed strategic forces. Soviet del. 
egares countered d1 ese proposals with their own demands, 
which included a total ban on all long-range cruise m~. 
siles. These ralks were broken off by rhe USSR in No-
vember 1983. They resumed on ly in March 1985, under 
rhe bilateral Nuclea r and Space Talks forum, afreran eas. 
ing of tensions over U.S. basing of ground-launched 
cruise missil es (GLCMs) and Pershing lis in Wesrern Eu. 
rope. The START I Treaty was finally reached on july 
31 , 1991. The Russ ian Federation, Republic of Belarus 
Ukraine, and Kazakhsran-four successor states of th; 
former Soviet Union-became parries to this treaty with 
rhe sign ing of me Lisbon Protocol in May 1992. 
In this rreary an agreed limit of 1,600 "deployed"stra· 
regie nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and 6,000 "ac· 
counrable" warheads (that is, warheads on the SNDYs) 
was set. For these warheads, lim irs were set at 4,900 for 
deployed I CBMs/SLBMs, 1, 100 for deployed mobile 
ICBMs, and 1,540 for deployed heavy ICBMs. Reduc· 
rions to rhe agreed upon limi rs were to rake place in three 
phases over rhe course of seven years. The rreary itself 
would be in force for fifteen years, at me end of which 
an option for extension exists. 
The first phase of reductions rook place no later than 
thirty-six months after treaty entry into force and wit-
nessed a lowering of SNDVs to 2,100 and warheads ro 
9,150 (of which only 8,050 could be deployed on 
ICBMs/SLBMs). The second phase of reductions wa.s 
slated to rake effect no later than sixty months after the 
treaty's entry inro force and would acllieve a lowering of 
SNDVs to 1,900 and warheads to 7,950 (of which only 
6,750 could be deployed on ICBMs/SLBMs). The third 
phase of reductions would rake place no later than eighty· 
four months after the treaty's entry into force and rep· 
resenrs the target numbers agreed upon in mis accord. 
Separate agreemenrs to this treaty limited SLCMs with 
ranges above 600 kilometers at 800 for each nation and 
lim ited Soviet Backfire bombers to 500. 
Three major criticisms of the START I Treaty exist. 
First, it fails to rake into accounr immense Soviet ICBMl 
SLBM reload capabilities (i .e., srraregic SNDV reserves). 
Second, rhe lack of parity berween Soviet and U.S. 
SNDVs was nor given consideration. The Soviet ICBM 
force was far more lethal d1an irs U.S. counterpart, yet 
born sides' ICBMs were counted equally. Lasr, me co~­
cepr of "accounrable" warheads deployed on SNDVs. JS 
Aawed. Photoreconnaissance suggests rhar me SovJet 
SS-18 force, whjch represented most of me Soviet's !CB~ 
- L d · h adili· 
u1row weight, was capable of being ourfitte wrr 
tional warheads per missile in violation of rreary rerrns. 
Because of chese criticisms, it has been argued chat che 
START I T reary al lowed the Soviets to use the rubric of 
arms reductions to ach ieve strategic offensive force mod-
erniza tion while at che same time denying such an option 
ro the United States. With che demise of che USSR and 
the signing in Ja.nuary 1993 of the START II agreement 
as yet unratified, many of chese criticisms may be al levi-
ated. The START II treaty eliminates all MIRY-equipped 
ICBMs and limits the overal l number of warheads to 
3,500 or fewer. 
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Strategic Defense Initiative 
The Strategic D efense Initiative (SDI) was a research and 
technology development program established by the 
United States in January 1984. T he Strategic D efense Ini-
tiative O rgan ization (SDIO) was created in April 1984 to 
explore five research concepts relating to a defense against 
ballistic missiles. Two of these concepts were based pri-
marily on forms of advanced non nuclear weaponry, 
directed-energy weapons (DEW): lasers and particle 
beams, and kinetic energy weapons (KEW): electromag-
netic and rail guns . The three other research concepts 
were surveill ance, acquisit ion, tracking and kill assessment 
(SATKA) , systems analysis and battle management (SN 
BM), and survivability, lethality, and key technologies 
(SLKT). 
The Reagan admin istration's primary rationale behind 
SDI was originally to protect the population of the 
United Stares and char of its allies by a "missile shield"; 
however, che emphasis shifted to one of deterrence and 
thereafter to lower Soviet capacity for preemptive strike 
capability against U.S . retaliatory forces. 
The USSR did not respond to che SOL Rather, the 
SDI was a response by rhe United Stares to me strategic 
missile defense program of the USSR. For years prior to 
the SDI, the Soviets had been actively creating and de-
ploying strategic missile defenses, at rimes in violation of 
Strategic Defense Initiative 1197 
tl1e 1972 Ami-Ballistic Missile (AB f) T reaty. Defenses 
fo r che ovier capital, Moscow represented rhe only fu lly 
operational ABM system deployed in cl1e world. 
Soviet doctrine and strategy emphasized rraregic de-
fense as a complement to the use of overwhelming offen-
sive forces. T he DI directly challenged Moscow' pre-
emptive m ike capab ili ty and , as a re ult placed it nnre 
military rrategy in jeopa rdy. Further, th DI threatened 
to rake the Cold War to a new rhre h ld and place rhe 
USSR in a no-wi n situatio n. A ballisri mis il e defen e 
race would place such an imm nse rrai n on the oviet 
econom ic and political sy rem rhar ir woull be unable to 
compere effectively aga inst a technologically advanced 
West unless ir adopted a marker eco nomy. T he adoptio n 
of this type of econo mic system would discred it and ul -
timately underm ine the ideology of the ovier Commu-
nist regime. 
In response, an in tensive propaganda and disinfor-
marion cam paign was directed aga inst the DI by the 
USSR. This well-coordinated campaign was conducted 
on a number of levels, including overt government arms 
conrrol efforrs, propaganda, and KG B-promoted active 
measures cl1at focused o n the SDI. 
The SDI program was reoriented in 199 1 under the 
Bush administration to defend aga inst lim ited ballistic 
missile threats and became known as global protectio n 
agai nst lim ited strikes (G PALS) . This program in rurn 
was reorganized under the Ballistic Missile Defense Or-
ganization (BMDO) by the C lin ton administration. The 
BMDO focused on theater missile defense (TMD) and 
contained very modest strategic ballistic missile defense 
research. 
The SDI was also known derogator ily as "s tar wars" 
because of the science fiction-like weaponry ir would re-
quire. T his type of weaponry, of which lasers are one 
example, is currendy beginning to be deployed by U.S. 
ground forces. 
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